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New Mexico Community Property Law:
The Senate Interim Committee
Report
Robert Emmet Clark*
A 1953 New Mexico Senate Resolution' called for a study
of the community property laws of the state. The Senate Judici-
ary Committee was constituted an Interim Committee "to study,
and to recommend to the Twenty-Second Legislature (1955),
legislation which will equalize the rights and obligations of
women under the community property law. . . ." Also to be
examined were "the problems of taxation, probate procedure,
disposing of community property by will, the economic effect
upon family businesses and other related problems involved in
any change of the community property laws."
As indicated in a Report 2 to the Committee, the terms
"equalize" and "equal rights" are not accurate or fortunate
expressions in this context. If the words were accepted literally
with respect to the economic status of women, the result would
be the impairment of important rights and advantages. It is be-
lieved that the actual point of focus of the resolution is the
problem of concurrent ownership, between husband and wife,
of the family resources. It is also believed that suggestions are
desired for improved legal techniques which will facilitate this
type of ownership while at the same time respecting the spouses'
rights of individual ownership.
The purpose of, as distinguished from the motive for,3 the
study was to review the community property method in New
* Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
1. Sen. Res. 3, 21st Legislature, State of New Mexico, 1953.
2. The term Report cited hereafter refers to THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
LAW OF NEW MExico: A REPORT TO THE SENATE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY PURSUANT TO SENATE RESOLUTION No. 3, by Joe W. Wood,
Assistant Director, New Mexico Legislative Council Service (21st Legislature,
State of New Mexico, 1954).
3. The motive for this study is found in a legislative compromise. Senate
Bill 6 which would have granted the wife testamentary power over her in-
terest in the community property was introduced but its future was un-
certain. The resolution authorizing a study was proposed, then the bill was
withdrawn. The resolution passed unanimously.
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Mexico with the intention of determining what specific in-
adequacies have developed since the present statutes were
enacted in 1907. That some complexities have arisen in nearly
half a century is not surprising. Nor is that fact in itself an
unfavorable comment on this form of marital property ownership.
Although it cannot be attempted here, it would be worthwhile,
perhaps, to compare the changes made in systems prevailing in
other states during the same period. It may be that the absence
of substantial changes in the New Mexico system since 1907 is
some evidence of its soundness and its adaptability. However,
complexities have developed. They parallel those in other areas
of law. And they are largely the result of economic expansion
and its accompanying changes in attitudes toward family secur-
ity. The marked transition from a rural, individual-conscious
society to an urban, group-conscious social order probably ac-
counts for much general dissatisfaction in the United States
with marital property laws. The movement of populations, in-
spired in part by cheap transportation and communication, is
another factor. New incentives for easy acquisition and quick
transfers of property augmented marital property problems.
Wage and salary schedules and employment opportunities have
been drastically altered. The whole taxation system has been
changed in the last generation. Divorce and mortality statistics
cannot be discounted. Life, liability and other forms of public
and private insurance are now standard security equipment of
perhaps a majority of families. These factors should not be
overlooked.
Dissatisfaction with existing forms of marital property own-
ership is not confined to the community states. The inadequacies
of separation of property regimes in the so-called common law
states are receiving attention.4 This is not strange when it is
remembered that the origins of those systems are mainly feudal
and, in spite of the Married Women's Acts,5 are essentially un-
realistic in modern times. No philosophy of family economic
unity underlies those systems. No legal co-ownership of family
4. Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband
and Wife, 15 MOD. L. REV. 133 (1952), 16 MOD. L. REV. 34, 148 (1953); Kepner,.
The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-A Concept Without a Name, 41
CALIF. L. REV. 596 (1954); Townsend, creation of Joint Rights Between Hus-
band and Wife in Personal Property, 52 MicH. L. REV. 779, 957 (1954).
5. The expression Married Women's Acts is used to cover the emanci-
patory legislation, passed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
which granted women the right to appear in court, make contracts, con-
veyances and manage their own property. See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS § 167 et seq. (1935). New Mexico's principal acts were passed in 1897.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-6-6(1953).
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resources exists although there apparently always have been
attitudes and actual practices of co-ownership between husband
and wife. Nevertheless, in law the family wherewithal was or
is either "his" or "hers" except where the parties-usually only
those with enough property to warrant seeking legal advice-
have arranged otherwise. In contrast, the community property
method is based on the philosophy that all marital gains are
"theirs."
The stated scope of the Report is the New Mexico law as it
exists today.6 No attention is given to departures from tradi-
tional community property principles. Nor is comment made on
the merit of such departures. The author of the Report quite
honestly does not attempt to cover the entire field of community
property law. "Rights and obligations arising from the family
relationship irrespective of ownership of property" are not dis-
cussed.? Conflict of laws problems, few of which appear in the
reported New Mexico cases, are omitted. References to decisions
in other states and to legal commentators are held to a minimum.
Despite the author's modest claim that the Report does not
cover Family Law,8 it is submitted that the Report might be
appropriately described as a review of one of the most important
areas of Family Law, the economic basis and solidarity of the
family.
Space limitations prevent a complete description of the New
Mexico system. It is sufficient to state that the community
property method has existed continuously in this region under
Spanish, Mexican and American rule. As part of the civil law
not "repugnant to or inconsistent with"9 the United States Con-
stitution and laws passed under its authority, the community
system was protected by the Kearny Code. The Organic Act
did not alter it. Except for a few statutes on inheritances and
conveyancing which, because they introduced the common law
theory of merger of husband and wife, caused some confusion
in the nineteenth century, the law of marital property, it was
believed until 1919,10 continued for over half a century after
6. REPORT, p. 11.
7. Id. at 12.
8. Ibid.
9. KEARNEY CODE, LAWS, § 1 (1846), in 1 N.M. STAT. ANN. p. 340 (1953).
10. See Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919), wherein the Su-
preme Court decided that a statute of 1876 that declares: "In all the courts
in this territory the common law as recognized in the United States of
America shall be the rule of practice and decision .. " had abrogated the
civil law, including the community property system, except to the extent
that it was preserved by statute. N.M. Laws 1876, c. 2, § 2; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3-3 (1953).
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the American conquest to be the civil law of Spain and Mexico
as it existed at the time of the Treaty of Guadalupe.1 1 In 1901
a comprehensive community property law was enacted.12 It
was repealed and replaced by the statutes of 1907,'13 which were
affirmed upon statehood in 1912.14 Except for a few changes 15
the 1907 statutes are the present community property law.
These statutes were patterned after California's.16 They
contain the essentials of community property policy as found
in the other community states; for example, separate property
is recognized and defined as property owned by either spouse
before marriage and acquired afterward by gift or inheritance
together with "the rents, issues and profits thereof."'7 All other
property acquired by either or both spouses after marriage is
presumed to be community.'8 The husband is charged with
the management and control of the marital property, 19 except
where he is incapacitated and the wife has been judicially ap-
pointed head of the community. 20 With respect to the community
realty, the husband's powers are limited.21 Upon dissolution of
the community by divorce or separation 22 there must be an equal
division of the marital gains.23 The husband has testamentary
11. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 53 (1943);
Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 26, 155 P.2d 1010 (1944): "Our community
property system is statutory, and with some exceptions, was adopted from
the laws of Mexico and Spain as it existed at the time of the signing of the
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo."
12. N.M. Laws 1901, c. 62, p. 112.
13. N.M. Laws 1907, c. 37, p. 46.
14. N.M. CONST. Art. 22, § 4.
15. See, e.g., N.M. Laws 1915, c. 84, § 1, p. 123, doing away with the re-
quirement of the wife's written consent for the disposal of community per-
sonalty by the husband; N.M. Laws 1927, c. 84, § 1, p. 259, providing for
direct conveyances between husband and wife; N.M. Laws 1947, c. 191, p.
393, providing that a conveyance to husband and wife described as such
in the instrument is presumed to be community property and changing part
of the effect of August v. Tillian, 51 N.M. 74, 178 P.2d 590 (1947).
16. See McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N.M. 27, 85 P.2d 78, 120 A.L.R. 250
(1938), overruled in Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781, 30 A.L.R.2d
1236 (1952).
17. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3-4, 57-3-5(1953).
18. Id. § 57-4-1.
19. Id. § 57-4-3. See Clark, Management and Control of Community
Property in New Mexico, 26 TULANE L. REV. 324 (1952).
20. Id. H6 57-4-5--57-4-9; Frkovich v. Petranovich, 48 N.M. 382, 151 P.2d
337, 155 A.L.R. 395 (1944).
21. See Frkovich v. Petranovich, 48 N.M. 382, 389, 151 P.2d 337, 342, 155
A.L.R. 295, 301 (1944): "[Wlhether the husband has, notwithstanding the
1915 amendment, some power of management of the community real prop-
erty superior to the power of the wife we do not consider nor decide .. "
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. ANN. § 22-7-2(1953) provides for separation and divi-
sion of property without stating any ground for divorce.
23. Sands v. Sands, 48 N.M. 458, 152 P.2d 399 (1944); Beals v. Ares, 25
N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919).
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power over one-half of the community estate, but the wife has
none.24 If she predeceases her husband all the community prop-
erty "belongs to" him without administration.25 Nevada is the
only other state with the same limitation on the wife's testa-
mentary power. 26 As to their separate property, the New Mexico
spouses have full and exclusive powers of control and dispo-
sition.27
This is an outline of the New Mexico system. Although
the system is entirely statutory, the courts still look to the civil
law of Spain and Mexico for interpretations.2 8
The Report to the Committee reviews carefully and then
summarizes the "inequalities" in the system.2 9 Suggestions are
made for improving it. However, the Committee expressly re-
serves authority 30 to draw its own conclusions and make its own
recommendations.
This article is an effort to discuss several questions raised by
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-1-8, 29-1-9(1953).
25. Id. § 29-1-9.
26. NEv. COMP. LAWS §§ 3395.01, 3395.02 (Supp. 1931-41).
27. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-1, 57-3-3(1953).
28. McDonald v. Senn, 53 N.M. 198, 201, 204 P.2d 990, 991 (1949): "The
law in this state regarding the property rights of husband and wife is
statutory, but was modeled after the civil law of Spain and Mexico and
those laws will be looked to for definitions and interpretations.
29. REPORT, C. XII, p. 137.
30. Id. Foreword, p. 3. The Senate Committee filed its own separate two
page report in January, 1955. After reciting the authority for the study and
the nature of the Committee's composition and work, the following Findings
and Recommendations were stated:
"The Community Property Law of New Mexico is a complicated,
interrelated structure of law based on our present statutes and on court
decisions. The committee finds that in its operation it is basically fair
in its application to all who in their daily lives come within its operation.
The committee doubts its ability to improve on a system derived from
human experience dating back to early Spanish history and therefore
recommends no change in the basic structure of our existing law.
"The committee, however, finds that recent court decisions have
caused uncertainty in two aspects of the law and therefore recommends
legislation for the purpose of clarifying these two aspects. ... I
Here the Committee expressed its concern over In re Trimble's Estate,
57 N.M. 51 (1953) and Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393 (1952) and submitted
proposed legislation, introduced in the 22d Legislature (1955) as Senate Bills
291 and 296, which declared that a joint tenancy may be proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence and requiring an instrument in writing to effect
a transmutation or change of status of real property. These bills were
passed but only that on proof of joint tenancy was signed into law.
This is the total result of two years of work, a long Report which cost
a good deal of money and which had for its stated goal: "Recommendations
toward equalizing the rights and obligations of women under the com-
munity property system. . ." and was prompted by proposed legislation which
would have granted the wife testamentary power over her interest in the
community property, a right which existed under Spanish law and exists in
all of the community states except New Mexico and Nevada. See note 3
supra.
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the Report. In addition, others will be asked. Proposed changes
will be suggested.
It was agreed at a meeting of the Committee that a rough
and ready distinction could be made between technical matters
and the broader policy considerations suggested by the Resolu-
tion. The distinction is preserved in the Report 3' and is followed
here although with complete awareness of the Committee's
privilege to view the distinction as no more than an approximate,
and at times overlapping, one.
POLICY QUESTIONS
The "Legal" Community
Antenuptial Agreements. Assuming that the community
property method is not to be abolished as has been suggested,8 2
an initial question is presented by a statute which reads:
Section 57-3-1 "Law applicable to property rights ...
The property rights of husband and wife are governed by
this chapter unless there is a marriage settlement containing
stipulations contrary thereto." 8
On the face of it this statute permits a prospective husband
and wife to employ methods other than the community for
property ownership. Shall this be continued? Another statute8 4
allowing husband and wife "to hold property as joint tenants,
tenants in common, or as community property" refers to post-
nuptial agreements but supports the same policy of free choice
of the form of ownership. The statute above referring to mar-
riage settlements contemplates antenuptial property arrange-
ments although the expression is often loosely applied to post-
nuptial agreements also. Postnuptial agreements are separately
and expressly provided for in the statutes.85
In New Mexico should the parties before marriage be per-
mitted to contract to hold property out of community? What
effect should be given to such an agreement made in another
state by persons who become domiciled in New Mexico? Shall
such agreements apply only to property in esse, or also to after-
acquired property?8"
31. Id. c. XIII, p. 153.
32. Ibid.
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-1(1953).
34. Id. § 57-3-2.
35. Id. § 57-2-6 et seq.
36. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 135, 136 (1948).
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No questions are intended to be raised here concerning
optional or contract community systems which obtained for
short times in Oklahoma and Oregon.3 1
Postnuptial agreements. Since the decision in Chavez v.
Chavez8" it is clear that postnuptial agreements are valid, even
when they involve a transformation in character of separate or
community property. That case overruled McDonald v. Lam-
bert39 which actually involved an antenuptial verbal agreement
and was so understood by the district court, but which was de-
cided in the Supreme Court as if it were a postnuptial agree-
ment. The McDonald case temporarily voided the effect of
statutes40 which expressly provide for postnuptial agreements.
As a matter of policy should husband and wife be permitted
to contract to hold property out of community? 41 Suppose they
are business partners. How will the Uniform Partnership Act
affect them?42 At one point the Report concludes, "Thus, either
a married man or woman may enter a partnership. ' '43 Does this
include a husband and wife partnership? Before the Uniform
Act was adopted either husband or wife could be the partner of
a third person.44 If husband and wife commercial partnerships
or postnuptial agreements are permitted will they apply to after-
acquired property and wages?
The repealed community property law of Oregon and Penn-
sylvania 45 provided for easy property transactions between hus-
band and wife involving community property in esse. No pro-
vision was made for postnuptial agreements transforming com-
munity property into separate property.
Transmutations. The existence and free use of other forms of
concurrent and separate ownership between husband and wife
other than community property raise the question of how far
transmutations from community to separate and vice versa
37. See Oregon Laws 1943, c. 440, p. 656. The Oregon system was pat-
terned after Oklahoma's and was repealed in 1945. In 1947 another com-
munity property law was enacted which was subsequently repealed. See
also Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
38. 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781 (1952).
39. 43 N.M. 27, 85 P.2d 78 (1938).
40. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-2-6(1953).
41. See Turley v. Turley, 44 N.M. 382, 103 P.2d 113 -(1940) for dicta
relevant to this question.
42. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-1(1953).
43. REPORT, C. VIII, p. 104.
44. See Adams v. Blumenshine, 27 N.M. 643, 204 Pac. 66, 20 A.L.R. 869
(1922).
45. Ore. Laws 1947, c. 525, § 9, p. 912; Pa. Acts 1947, No. 550, § 9, p. 1425.
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should be permitted.46  Gifts back and forth are not unusual.
"Joint bank accounts, '47 which are probably the most common
method for transmuting the wages and salaries of husband or
wife, or both, into a form of separate but undivided interests
possessing the sought after incident of survivorship, are widely
used in New Mexico. The question of the quantum of proof in
the joint bank account situations necessary to show intent has
not been raised as it has in the joint deed cases where the rule
is that the evidence must be "clear, strong and convincing. ' 48
The explanation for this may be found among the following:
(1) The holding in an earlier case 49 which did not involve com-
munity property or a transmutation but a deposit of the hus-
band's separate property in a joint account with his wife. After
the husband's death the court declared that the intent to create
survivorship rights in a joint bank account is more easily found
where the deposit is made in the name of the husband "or" wife.
(2) The effect given to the depositor's agreement with the bank
usually found on the application and signature card.5 More-
over, a statute protects the bank against double payment.51
(3) No situation has arisen since In re Trimble's Estate52 that
has been significant enough to carry to the Supreme Court.
Perhaps the only limitation on transmutations should be
the rules against fraudulent transfers and other remedies open
to creditors. It would seem that in family ownership matters
46. See Clark, Transmutations in New Mexico Community Property
Law, 24 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 273 (1952).
47. This phrase is susceptible of different interpretations in different
jurisdictions. See Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-A
Concept Without a Name, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 596 (1954); Townsend, Creation
of Joint Rights Between Husband and Wife in Personal Property, 52 MicH.
L. REV. 779, 957 (1954). Some states call it a joint tenancy. New Mexico
frankly recognizes it as something sui generis. Menger v. Otero County
State Bank, 44 N.M. 82, 98 P.2d 834 (1940).
48. See Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781 (1952).
49. Menger v. Otero County State Bank, 44 N.M. 82, 98 P.2d 834 (1940).
50. The following form is used by the largest New Mexico bank: "The
undersigned joint depositors hereby agree each with the Albuquerque Na-
tional Bank, all of Albuquerque, New Mexico, that all the sums heretofore
or hereafter deposited by said joint depositors, or either of them, with said
bank to their credit as such joint depositors shall be owned by them jointly
with right of survivorship and be subject to the check or order or receipt of
either of them or survivor of either of them, and payment thereof shall
discharge said bank from liability to either or to their heirs, executors, ad-
ministrators or assigns of either. This agreement shall not be changed
or terminated except by written notice to said bank, and such notice shall
not affect the right of the bank or said depositors hereunder with relation
to deposits theretofore made."
51. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-3(1953).
52. 57 N.M. 51, 253 P.2d 805 (1953).
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flexibility should not be discouraged. The Report discusses sev-
eral aspects of transmutation.53
Community Property and Common Law Estates
In community property states should joint tenancies and
tenancies in common be permitted between husband and wife?
The present law5 4 expressly provides for them. There are sound
arguments pro and con. 55
It appears that joint tenancy deeds are widely used in New
Mexico's most populous county. This probability was discussed
in a recent case5" which has been strongly criticized. The case
held that a deed to husband and wife in the form of joint tenancy
did not transmute the property from community to separate
property. The property was purchased with community funds.
When the husband died the wife petitioned for letters of admin-
istration alleging that the property was community. Later it
was discovered that the deed was in the form of joint tenancy.
The wife then claimed all the property by right of survivorship
as against a creditor, the hospital that had cared for the husband
in his last illness. The only evidence of any intent to transmute
community into separate property was the form of the deed.
The court said: "Stripping aside the technicalities of evidentiary
force, the root spirit of all of these decisions is intent, and rightly
so. Ultimately, if the dual estates of the common and civil law
can exist together compatibly, the amalgam must be the true
intention of the parties. . . ." The court then decided that the
general presumption of community property was not overcome
because the intent to transmute was not "clear, strong and con-
vincing" as shown by more than a mere preponderance of
evidence. The community property statute does not expressly
cover joint tenancies.
Special attention is given in the Report5 7 to the Trimble case
and the problems of joint tenancy. The Report contains a care-
ful sampling from real estate records of nine counties "chosen
on the basis of geographical location and diversity of economic
interests." The Report's conclusion is that joint tenancy deeds
are "fairly extensively used" in New Mexico.
53. REPORT, C. V, p. 27, c. VI, p. 57.
54. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-2(1953).
55. REPORT, C. III, p. 19, c. XII, p. 151.
56. In re Trimble's Estate, 57 N.M. 51, 253 P.2d 805 (1953).
57. REPORT, e. III, p. 19, c. XII, p. 151, c. XIII, p. 155.
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The Report" sets out in full the suggestions made to the
Committee for "correcting" the Trimble decision. There are a
number and they vary from the desire to abolish joint tenancies
between husband and wife to proposals for reducing the extra-
ordinary burden of proof to show a joint tenancy. The Report's
summary of these problems is particularly good.
In this same connection the question might be raised, why
not allow tenancies by the entirety in New Mexico? The argu-
ments against them given in Hernandez v. Becker 9 are not
entirely convincing. At the present time many people taking
property, particularly their homes, in joint tenancy do not
realize that either party has the power to break up that ten-
ancy. The argument that no one will purchase such an interest
is irrelevant. When creditors are in pursuit the question is:
May the creditor reach this particular interest on the ground
that the debtor has a power over it which the creditor now would
like to exercise (or have the bankruptcy trustee exercise) ? The
origin of tenancy by the entirety is obscure but it seems to
have been designed to meet this very problem. For all practical
purposes a tenancy by the entirety is little more than a special
kind of joint tenancy between husband and wife which neither
has the right nor the power to break up. This seems to be the
one notable example, along with the trust theory, of the common
law developing an attitude toward the family as an economic
unit of at least two persons.
The question has already been raised as to the existence of
a commercial partnership between husband and wife.61 Some
community states declare that the business and marital partner-
ships are incompatible.6 2
Assume that a husband and wife, using all the community
property they own, enter a business partnership. The New
Mexico Uniform Act 3 declares:
Section 66-1-25 "A partner's right in specific partner-
ship property is not subject to dower, curtesy or allowances
to widows, or next of kin, and is not community property."
58. Id. c. XIII, p. 155.
59. 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931). See also McDonald v. Senn, 53 N.M.
198, 204 P.2d 990, 10 A.L.R.2d 966 (1949).
60. See 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 126 (1927).
61. See page 577 supra.
62. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 148 (1953).
63. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-1(1953).
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(The italicized phrase was apparently copied from Cali-
fornia.) 6 4
Does this mean that a transmutation has taken place? Are
the spouses now "tenants in partnership?" What kind of prop-
erty is the income from the business, separate or community?
The Report does not go into these questions.
Whether or not commercial partnerships are allowed be-
tween husband and wife, some thought should be given to the
advisability of following partnership analogies in dealing with
the marital community. The resemblances are superficial and the
differences vital. There is a strong trend to regard the business
partnership as an "entity" for certain purposes. 5 Arizona and
Washington regard the community as an entity and have in-
volved themselves in considerable practical difficulty not to
mention specious legal reasoning.6 It is clear that the courts
do not generally regard the community as an entity in bank-
ruptcy 7 although a commercial partnership and its individual
members enjoy the benefits of that attitude.
This discussion raises the elementary question of whether
the family as a basic unit of society is to be given certain con-
siderations or priorities that individual members do not have
but which are enjoyed by other social institutions or legal organ-
izations. This is essentially the problem raised in tort cases and
cases involving the rights of creditors.
Presumptions
Presumptions are an integral part of the New Mexico com-
munity property system. Their significance generally in com-
munity property law is explained by one writer 8 as follows:
"In every one of the old community property states
there is a presumption that all property acquired by either
64. See CAL. CORPORATIONS CODE § 15025(2)(e) (Deering, Supp. 1953); 1
DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES.OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 80 (1943).
65. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended In 1938, 52 STAT. 845, 11
U.S.C. § 23 (1952); REPORT, C. VII, p. 101.
66. See, e.g., Donn v. Kunz, 52 Ariz. 219, 79 P.2d 965 (1938); King v.
Williams, 188 Wash. 350, 62 P.2d 710 (1936).
67. See Moore, The Community Property System and the Economic
Reconstruction of the Family Unit: Insolvency and Bankruptcy, 11 WASH.
L. REV. 61 (1936). In Washington the community entity may go through bank-
ruptcy but a discharge apparently does not release the individual spouses
entirely. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 180 (1943).
What the law is in New Mexico is far from clear. See REPORT, C. VIII, p. 92.
68. Ganong, Community Property and Presumptions, 28 ORE. L. REv.
157, 167 (1949).
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spouse during the marriage is community property. It is a
fundamental part of a true community system. It existed
under the Spanish law .... Such a presumption represents
the social policy of a true community state. It is also sup-
ported by the probability that property acquired during
marriage is more likely to be community than separate, and
it provides a uniform rule in cases where satisfactory evi-
dence is lacking, which are not infrequent. .. ."
The subject is an extremely technical one and will be given
only general consideration here. The Report69 devotes special
attention to the nature of presumptions and also to the amount
of evidence necessary to overcome or displace them.
The present New Mexico community property statute70
creates the following presumptions:
1. That all property acquired after marriage is com-
munity.
2. That property acquired by a married woman alone or
with a third person, by an instrument in writing, is separate
property (in the latter case, the interest of a "tenant in
common").
3. That property acquired by a married woman and her
husband described as such in the instrument is community.
The statute does not expressly cover joint tenancies. It has
been suggested7 that in the following sentence the italicized
phrase "the presumption is that the married woman takes the
part conveyed to her, as tenant in common unless a different
intention is expressed in the instrument" encompasses a joint
tenancy deed.
A fourth presumption must also be considered: the presump-
tion of gift to the wife of one-half where property stands in the
name of a man and woman who are husband and wife but who
are not described as such in the instrument.7 2 This presumption,
although it may not have been decisive, appears in a case which
is discussed elsewhere7 3 and is further analyzed in the Report.
7 4
The case prompted the legislature to add the third presumption
69. REPORT, C. V, p. 27.
70. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-1(1953).
71. REPORT, C. V, p. 51.
72. August v. Tillian, 51 N.M. 74, 178 P.2d 590 (1947).
73. See Clark, Presumptions in New Mexico Community Property Law:
The California Influence, 25 So. CALIF. L. Rsv. 149 (1952).
74. REPORT, C. V, p. 27, c. XIII, p. 157.
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listed above in 1947. 7 5 It is believed that that amendment is no
more than a clarification of the first general presumption in
favor of community. 6
All of these presumptions are rebuttable except with respect
to bona fide encumbrancers or purchasers, in which cases the
presumptions are conclusive. The statute does not, however,
prescribe the degree of proof or nature of evidence which will
overcome the presumptions. These questions have become par-
ticularly troublesome since the decision of In re Trimble's
Estate77 because (1) it required the quantum of proof to over-
come the general presumption of community property to be
extraordinary ("clear, strong and convincing" and more than a
mere preponderance of the evidence) and (2) it leaves in doubt
the degree of proof and the nature of the evidence necessary to
overcome the other presumptions. 78
Apart from the problems involved in distinguishing pre-
sumptions from inferences, and the difficulties in applying pre-
sumptions, it must be stated that the purpose of the general
presumption is clear: (1) It states the social policy behind
community-of-property thinking and (2) it has the practical
effect of resolving doubts in favor of co-ownership between the
spouses as against claims of separate ownership. The com-
mingling cases are examples.7 9
It has already been stated that the community property
statutes do not refer specifically to joint tenancies which are
permitted in New Mexico but must be expressly created. If
the problems augured in the Trimble case are to be met, special
attention must be given to joint tenancies. It is believed that
the New Mexico community property statutes should be re-
drafted with the following policy considerations uppermost in
mind:
1. This is a community state which has established the
principle of co-ownership of family property by husband and
wife.
2. Attacks on titles and uncertainty connected with the
form of ownership should be reduced to a minimum.
75. N.M. Laws 1947, c. 191, p. 393.
76. See Clark, Presumptions in New Mexico Community Property Law:
The California Influence, 25 So. CALiF. L. REv. 149 (1952).
77. 57 N.M. 51, 253 P.2d 805 (1953).
78. REPORT, c. XIII, p. 156.
79. See Stroope v. Potter, 48 N.M. 404, 151 P.2d 748 (1944).
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3. The form of a deed should be controlling (i.e., the form
should be taken as evidence of the state of mind of the grantees
that they intended the deed to be in a particular form) except in
unusual circumstances such as fraud, duress, etc.
The discussion in the Report80 concerning the effect of pre-
sumptions as rules of evidence or rules of property points out
that the real problem in both cases is to determine the amount
of evidence to overcome or displace a presumption. Any new
legislation must not ignore that problem.
In addition to the suggestions for corrective legislation con-
tained in the Report8 ' another idea is advanced herein for the
Committee's consideration. A simple statute could be drafted
which would follow the theory contained in the Model Code of
Evidence, Rule 703 on Legitimacy,8 2 and would read something
like this:
Whenever it is established that any property was ac-
quired during the marriage by husband and wife, the prop-
erty shall have the status of community property and the
party asserting that it is separate property has the burden
of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier
of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is sep-
arate property.
This would comport with the rule established in Chavez v.
Chavez s and In re Trimble's Estate.84
Another statute could be drafted which would refer specific-
ally to joint tenancies and tenancies in common and make it
necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that property
held in this form is not separate property. It is believed that
this type of statute should be applicable to both husband and
wife. The present statute establishing presumptions in favor of
married women only should be repealed. Still another statute
might be enacted for the benefit of abstractors and title exam-
iners which would create the beyond a reasonable doubt test
where the words "sole and separate estate""5 appear in a deed
either to a man or woman. The conclusive presumption for the
80. REPORT, C. V, p. 27.
81. Id. c. XIII, p. 153.
82. A.L.I., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942).
83. 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781, 30 A.L.R.2d 1236 (1952).
84. 57 N.M. 51, 253 P.2d 805 (1953).
85. The phrase "sole and separate" would seem to raise a rebuttal pre-
sumption under the present statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-1(1953) of sep-
arate property since an "intention is expressed in the instrument."
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benefit of the same class of persons now protected by the statute
should be retained.
The above suggestions are made with full recognition of
their common law influence. For under the civil law the actual
ownership was more important than the form of the title.86
However, it would seem that the experience of the code coun-
tries and the history of titles in this country demonstrate the
soundness of these proposals. Moreover, it is believed that the
aggravated ills of Chavez v. Chavez81 and In re Trimble's Es-
tate8" would be arrested if not cured.
Creditors' Rights and Liability to Third Persons
Great confusion prevails in this area, and not just in New
Mexico.8 9 No attempt will be made to resolve it in this summary.
However, the main outlines of the difficulty can be pointed out.
A clear policy must be adopted with respect to:
1. Liability for the husband's antenuptial and postnuptial
debts.
2. Liability for the wife's antenuptial torts.
3. Liability of the community property for torts, "commu-
nity" and separate, of either spouse.
Answers to these problems are hinted at in some of the
cases. They are not entirely clear in the statutes. One case90
lays down the rule that the community property may be taken
on execution for the wife's separate postnuptial tort. The case
held that her half of the community was liable. Suppose her
half were not enough to satisfy the judgment? Is the rule of
McDonald v. Senn 9' applicable to the husband's torts also?
What is a "community tort," if there is such a wrong?
The above is no more than a sketch of some of the sub-
stantive problems. If certain creditors' rights are recognized,
then procedural methods must be improved for enforcing them
by (1) establishing the order of liability of community and
separate property and (2) clarifying the priorities among com-
86. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 60 (1943).
87. 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781, 30 A.L.R.2d 1236 (1952).
88. 57 N.M. 51, 253 P.2d 805 (1953).
89. See Daggett, Policy Questions on Marital Property Law in Louisiana,
14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 528 (1954); 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY §§ 167-70, 178-80 (1943).
90. McDonald v. Senn, 53 N.M. 198, 204 P.2d 990, 10 A.L.R.2d 966 (1949).
91. Ibid.
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munity creditors and individual antenuptial and postnuptial
creditors of the spouses.
The Arizona statute92 may be a guide in this matter. Any
new legislation should not overlook bankruptcy problems and
the vast penumbra in this area.93
Before remedies for the above problems are proposed there
should be a re-examination of the conflict of interests between
the family and those outside of it, for example, creditors. Therein
lies the basis of any determination of policy. This means, of
course, that exemption statutes, insolvency procedures and fam-
ily support and expense statutes should be studied and re-
appraised. Obviously community property principles would play
only a part in such a project.
Income, Increases and Profits from Separate Property
A controversial issue is purposely raised by this question:
Should the present New Mexico statutes be changed to make
the income and profits of separate property community prop-
erty? This is the law of Louisiana, Texas and Idaho.9 4 This was
the original Spanish law. Why was it changed and is it advan-
tageous to the family unit?
The present statutes are stepchildren of the Married
Women's Acts. These acts were followed, blindly many times,
in the late nineteenth century. They were promoted by the com-
mendable desire to allow married women in the common law
states to own and control their own property. They were in-
spired by equity's realistic treatment of the woman of property.
However, under the community property system a married
woman always owned her separate property. The corpus of such
property always remained separate. But the income and fruits
belonged to the marital partnership which presumably made
maximum use of the corpus. The basis for this practice and the
changes that have developed have been explained as follows:
"One of the principal aims of the Spanish law was pro-
tection of the family, and .toward that end property was kept
in a family as much as possible. Community of property
was one of the methods for achieving this goal. The limita-
tion on succession was another. The ownership of separate
property by either or both spouses was an inextricable but
92. ARIz. CODE ANN. § 63-305 (1939).
93. REPORT, C. VIII, p. 157.
94. 1 DE FUNiAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 71 (1943).
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entirely subordinate element in the Spanish system. Under
modern community property statutes decided emphasis is
placed on separate property. Thus in five community States
the 'rents, issues and profits' of separate property remain
separate instead of becoming 'acquests and gains' of the mar-
riage.
"The Spanish law's recognition of separate property
seems to have been mainly for the purpose of returning
such property to the family line of the particular spouse,
who, during his or her lifetime or marriage had the right to
its use and enjoyment. There were express limitations on
the testamentary right of a spouse to dispose of separate
property beyond the spouse's immediate family.
"At least in this area of old Spanish law, the emphasis
was on use rather than 'ownership'. Hence the recognition
of usufructuary and other rights in the marital partnership,
and the rule that the increase and income from separate
property was community property." 95
The Married Women's Acts were not designed to correct any
injustices in a system of this nature. But they were not fully
understood by the New Mexico settlers who brought this legis-
lation with them. The confusion created by these acts is a
matter of record:
"The personal and property rights of married women are
in a sadly muddled condition. The confusion which existed
under the Compiled Laws, of 1884, was worse confounded by
the acts of 1887, and in order to harmonize the two or make
either one intelligible, further legislation is necessary. This
is one of the most important changes necessary in our laws
to bring them in harmony with the legislation in other parts
of the Union. .... 96
The legislation making the income and profits of separate
property separate property has probably engendered the greatest
confusion and inequities to be found in the system.
"The right of husband or wife to own separate property
was an integral part of Spanish community property law
and is an even more important, and at times a distorted,
95. Clark, Matrimonial Law in New Mexico and the Western United
States, MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY Vol. II, pp. 89-138, Comparative Law Series,
University of Toronto (1955).
96. NEw MEXICO STATE BAR PROCEEDINGS 26 (1888).
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feature of the community systems in the United States where
the category of separate property has been greatly enlarged
by statute. Under Spanish law separate property remained
separate property. This is still the settled rule in all the
community states. However, under Spanish law, and under
the present law of Idaho and Texas, the income and fruits
of separate property become community property. Today by
statute in the other community States such increases and
profits remain separate property. The proposition that 'the
rents, issues and profits' of separate property are separate
property is being re-examined these days for several reasons.
First, the application of such a rule is very difficult, no mat-
ter how clearly it is stated in the statute, because of the
general presumption in favour of community property and
the problems involved in tracing funds. Second, such a rule
theoretically requires that the average middle class family
keep three sets of books of account, one for each spouse's
separate income or profits and one for the community gains.
Third, it has the effect of further enlargement of lien and
equity theories which are already amorphous and unwieldy.
The idea of preserving the separate identity of the income
and fruits of separate property betrays the influence of Eng-
lish common law separation of property theories which
Professor Kahn-Freund and others have shown to be in-
adequate in modern family life.
"In a few of the community States, as previously ex-
plained, the wife has also been given complete ownership
of her wages and earnings which, of course, is a statutory
contradiction of community property principles."
It is suggested that further study be given to the community
property statutes of the so-called "new community states," es-
pecially Pennsylvania, Oklahoma and Oregon, which took notice
of this difficult problem 8 Those states repealed their systems,
but that is no criticism of this particular point.
The Report analyzes this general problem and offers sugges-
tions for alleviating it29
97. See note 95 supra.
98. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 71 (1943);
Daggett, Louisiana Legislation of 1944-Matters Pertaining to the CiAZ Code
6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1 (1944).
99. REPORT, c. XIII, p. 159.
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Conflict of Laws and Problems of Descent and Distribution
One area which the Report admittedly0 0 does not attempt
to cover is Conflicts. Yet the subject is relevant to any study of
marital property law10 ' and particularly community property.
New Mexico's population has greatly increased in the past
decade.10 2 The new residents, many of them presumably from
non-community states, have brought property and funds with
them. Many of these new residents will, in a short time, become
indistinguishable from the older residents; they will raise fam-
ilies, retire and leave property to their heirs. Many others, how-
ever, live on or near military and atomic energy installations
and within an area of federal jurisdiction which is not always
clearly or realistically defined. These people "reside" in New
Mexico for some purposes and yet for other purposes they are
treated by the law as outsiders.10 3 These circumstances create
doubt and uncertainty in property, inheritance and other marital
matters. The legislatures of the individual states and the Con-
gress of the United States 0 4 cannot ignore this. It is believed
that the New Mexico legislature should anticipate some of the
problems.
Two recent New Mexico decisions'"3 involving a 1951 amend-
100. Id. c. I, p. 12.
101. See MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS (1952); 1 ARM-
STRONG, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW 537 et seq., §§ G, I (1953).
102. The New Mexico population in 1940 was 531,818. In 1950 it was
681,187, an increase of 28.1%. In the continental United States during the
same period the increase was 14.5%. 1 1950 CENSUS OF POPULATION-NUM-
BER OF INHABITANTS.
103. See Arledge v. Mabry, 52 N.M. 303, 197 P.2d 884 (1948); Chaney v.
Chaney, 53 N.M. 66, 201 P.2d 782 (1949), holding that persons living at Los
Alamos had no right to vote or obtain a divorce because land acquired in
New Mexico by the United States through condemnation was not "in New
Mexico" within meaning of constitutional provisions dealing with rights
of electors, and persons at Los Alamos are not "residents of the state" within
meaning of the divorce statute. See subsequent legislation creating Los
Alamos county and correcting these conditions: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 15-15-
1(1953).
104. 68 STAT. 961 (1954) (Atomic Energy Act). "There is hereby retroced-
ed to the State of New Mexico the exclusive jurisdiction heretofore acquired
from the State of New Mexico by the United States of America over the
following land of the United States Atomic Energy Commission in Bernalillo
County and within the boundaries of the Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New
Mexico. [There follows the legal description of the area.]
"This retrocession of jurisdiction shall take effect upon acceptance by
the State of New Mexico. Approved August 30, 1954." Id. c. 19, § 3.
Governor E. L. Mechem accepted state jurisdiction on September 20, 1954.
Senator Anderson's amendment, however, does not cover other areas in
New Mexico where questions of "exclusive jurisdiction" are equally relevant.
105. Crownover v. Crownover, 274 P.2d 127 (N.M. 1954); Wilson v. Wilson,
272 P.2d 319 (N.M. 1954).
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ment to the New Mexico statute0 6 on the residence requirement
in divorce actions, which amendment reads:
".. . and provided further, persons serving in any Military
branch of the United States Government who have been
continuously stationed in any Military Base or installation
in the State of New Mexico for such period of one (1) year,
shall for the purposes hereof, be deemed residents in good
faith of the State and County where such military base or
installation is located."
exemplify one aspect of the general problem. The New Mexico
Supreme Court has in effect through its interpretation of the
provision decided that the New Mexico legislature has the power
to define "residence" or physical presence, as being equal to
"domicile" for the purpose of divorce. This seems to ignore the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
and the cases 10 7 discussing the traditional concept of domicile
as the basis of jurisdiction in divorce. In any event, the cases
call attention to Conflicts problems. The divorce problem is not
a direct part of the Committee's community property study, but
the property consequences of divorce certainly are.
The property rights of married persons employed at or
residing on atomic energy installations, military posts and other
quasi-federal reservations in New Mexico should be made clearer.
As these people become older and accumulate more property
rights, with the same or a new spouse, their problems will multi-
ply. Many of the homes and other tangible property owned by
these people were purchased with funds brought to this state,
which funds were legally the property of one or the other
individual spouse. So long as there is no divorce and neither
spouse dies, practical arrangements concerning ownership are
possible between the spouses. However, dissolution of the mar-
riage by divorce or death demands that the law find an answer
to problems of ownership and inheritance. If the "source theory"
is followed logically in these situations it is apparent that much
property now believed to be community property clearly is not.
This general problem requires attention in two areas. One
is concerned with property owned by living persons who may
106. N.M. Laws 1951, c. 107, § 1, p. 166.
107. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), judgment vacated,
74 Sup. Ct. 736 (1954); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); see
also Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 214 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1954), cert.
granted, 75 Sup. Ct. 60 (1954).
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wish to sell, transmute, or encumber it, and the other concerns
the estates of deceased persons.
Living persons.
It is suggested that a statute be considered which would set
forth the community property policy of this jurisdiction in clear
language. Arizona has the following statute:108
"The marital rights of persons married out of this state, who
may move to this state, shall in regard to property acquired
in this state during the marriage be regulated by the laws
of this state."
Notice that the Arizona statute does not employ the phrase
"real and personal property." Nor does it refer to persons who
"reside" in the state or are "domiciled" there. Any proposed New
Mexico legislation should consider the implications of all of these
terms. The distinction between residence and domicile must be
recognized in view of the recent divorce cases. Another aspect
of the general problem can be illustrated by referring specifically
to the married persons employed by the Sandia Corporation or
at Los Alamos and the service man attached to a military base
in New Mexico who "resides" with his or her family in the state,
who may vote and even get a divorce, but who may consciously
possess a definite intention to return to Iowa or New Jersey,
thus barring him or her from acquiring "domicile" in the
traditional sense. Are the man's wages or salary community
property? May his wife's wages be garnished by a community
creditor? Is the family home which is held by a deed to husband
and wife, who are so described in the instrument, community
property? Is the family car held in the husband's name com-
munity property? The husband and wife have a right to know
with some degree of certainty, the burdens and benefits of
various forms of ownership of marital property. It is obvious
from these elementary questions that the "source" or time of ac-
quisition theory in these situations could lead to interminable and
expensive litigation which would undermine the family.
Deceased persons.
Testamentary power. Most of the people now moving into
the state probably have normal life expectancies. However,
clarification is needed at once with respect to their property
108. A~iz. CODE ANN. § 63-306 (1939).
1955]
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rights. California has pioneered the problem.10 9 Statutes have
been passed providing for the descent of separate property in
the same manner as community property if, at the time it was
acquired, it would have been community property under Cali-
fornia law.110
It has been suggested that the California statutes be amended
to include real property."' If new legislation is proposed in New
Mexico serious consideration should be given to the provisions
of the California Probate Code and the suggestions that have
been made for improving them. It is believed that careful
draftsmanship will recognize the general rule that the situs of
land ordinarily governs its devolution and yet appropriate lan-
guage can be used in order to follow community property
principles.
This type of legislation would, of course, require further
study of the very problem which prompted the New Mexico
Report:" 2 the granting of testamentary power to the wife over
her share of the community estate. There has been no objective
showing i8 that the community property states, and there are
six, which permit the wife this power have had unusual or in-
superable problems as a consequence. It would be absurd to
conclude that New Mexico and Nevada, which do not grant the
wife this power, have had a unique problem with wives pre-
deceasing husbands. Statistics and mortality and longevity tables
are all to the contrary. 114 It should be recalled, also, that the
New Mexico statutes were patterned after California's"l5 at a
time when the married woman in that state had no more than
an expectant interest in the community property." 6 Not to allow
her to dispose by will of property she did not own or control was
entirely logical and understandable. However, since 1927 the
California wife has had a "present, existing and equal""17 interest
109. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5 (Deering, 1949); In re Way's Estate,
157 P.2d 46 (Cal. App. 1945); Estate of Thornton, 1 Cal.2d 1, 83 P.2d 1, 92
A.L.R. 1343 (1934).
110. CAL. PROS. CODE §§ 201.5, 202, 203 (Deering, 1949).
111. Notes, 35 CALIr. L. REv. 121 (1947), 19 So. CAL. L. REV. 39 (1945).
112. See note 3 supra.
113. See REPORT, c. XII, pp. 148, 151, for reasons against allowing wife
testamentary power.
114. Id. c. II, p. 15.
115. See McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N.M. 27, 85 P.2d 78 (1938), overruted in
Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781 (1952). Until 1923 the California
statute gave all the community property to the husband upon the wife's
death.
116. See Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308 (1860).
117. CAL. Civ. Code § 161a (Deering, 1949).
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in the community property and testamentary power over it has
been granted to her.", In New Mexico the wife is in the posi-
tion of owning a "vested" interest in the community property
which will inure to the benefit of her separate judgment cred-
itor,119 but upon her death she is denied the power and the priv-
ilege of leaving the same property to the man who was largely
responsible for accumulating it because "No other course would
be logical unless the lawmakers desire to add to the sorrows of a
bereaved husband the further burden of the enforced liquidating
of his business affairs upon the death of the wife."'1
The rationale of In re Chavez's Estate is not as solid as the
tax savings it has engendered. At the present time the latter are
the principal justification for reliance on the case. The decision
is based on an attitude toward marriage and the family which
has little sociological support today. It is a summary of tax
theories which have been outmoded for two decades, and it is an
example of statutory interpretation which sees a clean line be-
tween tax matters and other property ownership concepts. The
prophetic phrases of the case have been greatly overvalued and
they have little support in statistics or experience.
Intestate succession.
The New Mexico statute121 which provides that in cases of
intestacy of the husband, three-eighths of the community prop-
erty shall go to the surviving children in equal shares is a ves-
tige of the early civil law. It no longer serves the purpose orig-
inally intended which in an agricultural society was to keep land
in the family line. Such a method of disposition is impractical
and expensive in a money and personal property-owning society.
The statute needs re-examination. Where the surviving children
are minors the provision is particularly unworkable. 122 The
California statutes are offered as examples of the type of statute
needed in New Mexico.
Methods of Changing the Law
The Report 12 emphasizes the policy matter involved in
choosing the method by which the community law may be im-
118. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (Deering, 1949). The wife's testamentary power
has existed since 1923 and relates only to property acquired since that date.
Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal.2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944).
119. McDonald v. Senn, 53 N.M. 198, 204 P.2d 990, 10 A.L.R.2d 966 (1949).
120. In re Chavez's Estate, 34 N.M. 258, 280 Pac. 241, 69 A.L.R. 769 (1929).
121. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-9(1953).
122. See REPORT, C. XII, p. 148.
123. Id. c. XIII, p. 153.
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proved. If, as a result of the Committee's study and recommen-
dations, changes in the present law are proposed the decision
as to the method selected for accomplishing the changes should
be the product of careful thought.
Codification has not proved to be a cure-all in many fields of
law. Piecemeal legislation has not always brought about the
desired changes without also, in many cases, creating complica-
tions larger than those it attempts to correct. The Married
Women's Acts may be cited in support of this statement.
Some of the legislation needed will be primarily curative or
clarificatory in nature. In this area the Report 2 4 wisely cautions
against collision with constitutional principles which, if not
thoroughly understood by legislative draftsmen, may result in
legislation that will be given prospective effect only by the
courts. The unfortunate and confused experience of California
in the realm of legislative draftsmanship and judicial interpre-
tation 2 5 should be a clear warning to the New Mexico Legis-
lature.
TECHNICAL CHANGES
Several topics discussed in the preceding pages illustrate
the interrelationship of policy and technical matters. The fol-
lowing summary may be viewed either as an extension of policy
considerations, or as a distinct category of problems which can
be largely eliminated by changes in the present law.
Contracts and Conveyances
In view of a recent decision 2 6 the statute'2 7 delegating cer-
tain powers of management and control to the husband is in
need of clarification. Henderson v. Treadwell'2 involved a real
estate contract for the sale of community property signed by a
married man posing as single. The purchaser moved on the
premises and made payments and improvements. Later, as a part
of a divorce decree, the contract was set over to the wife of the
seller. The case decided that the purchaser under the contract
acquired rights that would be protected; that the purchaser had
a right to a deed to the property. The court held that the mar-
124. Id. c. XIII, p. 158.
125. See Armstrong, "Prospective" Application of Changes in Community
Property Control--Rule of Property or Constitutional Necessity?, 33 CALIF.
L. REV. 476 (1945). See also Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal.2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944).
126. Henderson v. Treadwell, 58 N.M. 230, 269 P.2d 1108 (1954).
127. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-3(1953).
128. 58 N.M. 230, 269 P.2d 1108 (1954).
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ried woman, who had made various promises to the purchasers
that they would get a deed, was estopped by her conduct and
could not rely on the fact that her husband alone had signed
the contract.
The present statute does not expressly cover real estate
contracts which are widely used in New Mexico. However, the
husband has authority to make all ordinary contracts for the
community. But an earlier case 120 held that a contract for the
sale of community realty was unenforceable unless jointly exe-
cuted by both spouses. Another case 13 0 held that a deed by a
husband as sole grantor was absolutely void and did not convey
even his interest in the community property. The theory of
that case was relied on by the two dissenting justices in the real
estate contract case.'
31
An amendment to the statute should clarify the rules appli-
cable in these circumstances. Perhaps the rule of Jenkins v.
Huntsinger132 should be changed to make a deed by one spouse
voidable merely and not absolutely void as is the present rule.
Presumptions and the Retroactive Effect of Changes
It is believed that the part of the decision in August v. Til-
lian13 3 which was not abrogated by the amendment of 194714
should be changed so that property now standing in the names
of husband and wife who are not described as such in the in-
strument will be held to be community property, or separate
property in which each has an equal although undivided interest.
At the present time the rule is that one-half of such property
is the separate property of the wife and the other half is com-
munity property, thus allowing the wife a three-fourths interest.
The unwelcome ramifications of In re Trimble's Estate'35
have already been discussed. Technical methods for handling
presumptions of community property or joint tenancy in a clear
manner can be devised.
It is believed that the decisions in the above cases are not
"rules of property"'136 which if altered would disturb "vested
129. Adams v. Blumenshine, 27 N.M. 643, 204 P.2d 66, 20 A.L.R. 369 (1922).
130. Jenkins v. Huntsinger, 46 N.M. 168, 125 P.2d 327 (1942).
131. Henderson v. Treadwell, 58 N.M. 230, 269 P.2d 1108 (1954).
132. 46 N.M. 168, 125 P.2d 327 (1942).
133. 51 N.M. 74, 178 Pac. 590 (1947).
134. N.M. Laws 1947, c. 191, § 1, p. 393.
135. 57 N.M. 51, 253 P.2d 805 (1953). See pages 583-585 supra.
136. See Justice Seymour, concurring specially in Brown v. Gurley, 267
P.2d 134, 142 (N.M. 1954).
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rights." Legislation can be drafted which will have retroactive
effect' " and thereby clear away much uncertainty concerning
titles and the quantum of proof necessary to show a particular
form of ownership, or the status of specific property as separate
or community.
Agency Problems
The Report' 8 recommends that general agency problems be
kept out of problems of control and management. However, it
might be possible to clarify the managerial powers of the hus-
band by a minor statutory change. Frkovich v. Petranovich"39
indicates that there is no "head" of the community realty. This
statement is to be doubted except where it is applicable to the
power to convey or encumber community realty. Some one cer-
tainly has the power to make decisions concerning the use of
community realty.
The powers of attorney between spouses, including those of
minor spouses, need statutory integration and clarification. The
Report contains suggestions on this matter.
1 40
Rights and Priorities of Creditors
A statute is needed which will take care of both tort and
contract creditor situations, clarify insolvency and bankruptcy
remedies, and determine what kind of property, community or
separate, and in what order, a creditor may seek satisfaction.1
41
"Instrument in Writing"
If the present statute on presumptions is altered or improved,
some thought should be given to a definition of the phrase
"instrument in writing" contained in the statute.142 In some
states the phrase has been limited in interpretation to include
titles to real property only. 48
Insurance
Provision should be made for situations, not at all rare, in
which life insurance premiums have been paid out of commu-
• 137. See Clark, Management and Control of Community Property in New
Mexico, 26 TULANE L. REv. 324 (1952).
138. REPORT, C. XII, p. 144.
139. 48 N.M. 382, 151 P.2d 337 (1944).
140. REPORT, C. VII, p. 75.
141. See page 585 supra.
142. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-1(1953); see REPORT, C. XIII, p. 17.
143. See Dorsey v. Barba, 226 P.2d 677 (Cal. App. 1951), 38 Cal.2d 350,
240 P.2d 604 (1952); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Wellman, 98 Cal. App.2d 151,
219 P.2d 506 (1950).
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nity funds for long periods of time although the policy, having
been purchased before marriage, is separate property.144 Either
the proceeds of the policy should be prorated on the basis of the
percentage of the premiums paid in from community or separate
funds, or one-half of the premiums paid out of community funds,
plus interest, should be returned to the spouse who does not
share in the proceeds. The urgency of this problem can be
gleaned from the Report's 145 discussion of Wissner v. Wissner 46
which has established a rule with respect to National Service
Life Insurance which is contrary to community property prin-
ciples but is not binding in commercial insurance cases. The
practical necessity for a clear way to determine the respective
spouses' interest in life insurance proceeds or policies is illus-
trated graphically in both death cases and divorce-property
settlement cases.
Community Property Ownership v. Duty of Support
The Report 147 points out the confusion in the understanding
of the two concepts and states that the distinction is fundamental.
Clarification of the statutes on divorce, separation,'148 and prop-
erty settlement procedures14 9 would help dispel much of this
confusion.
It is believed that a "family expense" statute' 50 should be
enacted. This type of statute deals with the obligations of mar-
riage and is not concerned with whether property is separate
or community. The Report'5 1 does not look favorably on this
type of legislation. However, it is believed that such legislation
would be entirely appropriate in community states where the
wife actually owns part of the family resources and not merely
her pin money. Such a statute should (a) cover more than
"necessaries" which are all that most support statutes include,
(b) make both spouses personally liable, but the wife only sec-
ondarily liable after the husband. It appears that most statutes
intended this effect, but the courts in giving them a literal read-
ing extended personal liability to the husband only. 52
144. In re White's Estate, 43 N.M. 202, 89 P.2d 36 (1939).
145. REPORT, C. VI, p. 69.
146. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
147. REPORT, C. XIII, p. 154.
148. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1(1953).
149. Id. §§ 57-2-6--57-2-13.
150. See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 160 (1935).
151. REPORT, C. XII, p. 145, C. II, p. 15.
152. See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 160 (1935).
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An amendment to the California statute'1 3 makes the wife's
wages liable for necessaries furnished the community. The
amendment is evidence of the existing confusion over support
and community property ownership principles. The New Mexico
statute'5 4 exempting a wife's wages from liability for her hus-
band's debts was copied from California. It is made apparent by
the California amendment 155 that California failed to understand
that the statute did not exempt the wife's wages from community
debts, at least for necessaries. In New Mexico the wife's wages,
being community property, are liable for community debts and
are not merely liable for community debts arising out of the
purchase of necessaries. As the Report' 56 seems to indicate, it is
the husband's separate debts for which the wife's wages cannot
be taken. However, statutory clarification of the point would be
helpful.
Descent and Distribution
Clarification is needed of the meaning of "decedent's estates"
used in the statutes,'5 7 particularly for tax purposes and for the
purpose of determining the source of payment for funeral ex-
penses, gravestones, expenses of administration and, perhaps
most importantly, executors' and attorneys' fees. When a mar-
ried man predeceases his wife, and the Report'5 8 carefully
marshals the evidence for this probability, should the base for
attorneys' fees be the entire community estate or only half of
it? In re Stutzman's Estate'5 9 foreshadows these problems. It is
believed that the practice is by no means uniform in the state
or even in the same law office.
Testamentary power. (1) It has not been demonstrated by
the experience of the other community states that allowing the
wife testamentary power over her interest in the community
property has resulted in excessive hardship, difficult legal prob-
lems or a decline in economic enterprise. 6 Two of the least
populous and least wealthy states, Nevada and New Mexico, do
not grant the wife this power. It would not be reasonable to
assume that only these two states possess a proper understand-
153. CAL. CIv. CODE § 168 (Deering, 1949).
154. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-6(1953).
155. CAL. STAT. & CODE AMEND. 1497 (1937).
156. REPORT, C. VIII, p. 89.
157. See In re Stutzman's Estate, 57 N.M. 710, 262 P.2d 990 (1953); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 29-1-9, 31-16-3(1953).
158. REPORT, C. II, p. 15.
159. 57 N.M. 710, 262 P.2d 990 (1953).
160. REPORT, c. XII, pp. 150-151, raises these questions.
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ing of the problem. The justification for the denial in New
Mexico is tax savings.161 The possibilities expressed in In re
Chavez's Estate16 2 remain, but the probabilities, which are far
more relevant, that wives will predecease husbands,163 are not
great. As a caveat to the Chavez case it should be emphasized
that:
(a) the case was a tax decision
(b) the case was decided before the new era of taxation
which is based on dominion and control theories and not
on formal ownership or title
(c) the case contradicts the idea that the wife owns one-
half of the community estate.
(2) Changes in the statutes. Before changes in testamentary
provisions are made, if any are contemplated, consideration
should be given to the statutes of Idaho and Louisiana,'6 4 which
limit the extent to which a spouse may leave his or her share of
the community property by will. For comparative purposes the
Idaho statute is quoted:
Section 14-113, Idaho Code 1948 reads:
"Devolution of Community Property-Upon the death
of either husband or wife, one-half of all of the community
property shall go to the survivor, subject to the community
debts, and the other half shall be subject to the testamentary
disposition of the deceased husband or wife, in favor only of
the survivor, the children, the grandchildren or parents of
either spouse, or one or more of such persons, subject also
to the community debts; provided, that not more than one-
half of the decedent's half of the community property may
be left by will to a parent or parents, unless limited to an
estate for life or less . . . . [other provisions unimportant]"
One criticism of the statute is made. There should be a
provision for leaving a portion of the decedent's property, to be
determined by the legislature, to charitable institutions or for
161. In New Mexico when the wife predeceases the husband, "the entire
community, without administration, belongs to the surviving husband."
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-8(1953). This statute has been interpreted to mean
that no state succession tax is collectible when the wife dies, In re Chavez's
Estate, 34 N.M. 258, 280 P.2d 241, 69 A.L.R. 769 (1929). The same rule
was followed in a federal estate tax case, Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542
(10th Cir. 1931).
162. 34 N.M. 258, 280 P.2d 241, 69 A.L.R. 769 (1929).
163. REPORT, C. II, p. 15.
164. Arts. 1493, 1494, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870.
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similar purposes. The tax savings aspects of donations and the
public benefit therefrom should not be overlooked.
Intestate succession. The California and Idaho statutes do
not provide that upon intestacy a portion of the decedent's inter-
est should go to the children. New Mexico has such a provision
which should be abolished.0 5 Reasons for such a change are
stated at page 593 supra.166 It is also suggested that a summary
probate procedure statute for small estates be enacted in New
Mexico. The present statute1 7 is so limited as to be worthless
for the purposes discussed herein.
Jurisdiction in Probate
The lawyer handling a probate matter should know with
more than reasonable certainty whether a particular question
should be raised in the probate or the district court. A recent
case" 8 draws attention to the lawyer's uncertainty in New
Mexico.
It seems clear that the probate court, which in New Mexico
is a separate county court 9 usually presided over by a layman,
has always exercised both judicial and administrative functions.
But serious questions have been raised as to its jurisdiction
to try titles to realty 7" or determine the status of specific prop-
erty as separate or community. 17 ' Recent legislation 72 attempted
to clarify the first matter. With respect to the second question
legislative clarification is needed because of:
(1) The present constitutional problem of probate juris-
diction 78
165. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-9(1953). The statute declares that in the
absence of testamentary disposition by the husband of his one-half of the
community estate, such property "goes one-fourth to the surviving wife and
the remainder In equal shares to the children of the decedent and further
as provided by law .. " One-fourth of the husband's one-half means the
surviving wife then has a total of % of the entire community estate and the
children receive % of % or %. See Weinmann, Surviving Spouse's Inheri-
tance of the Decedent Spouse's Interest in the Community in an Intestate
Succession: A Comparative Study of the Law of Mexico, Quebec and Louisi-
ana, 28 TULANE L. Rzv. 480 (1954).
166. See page 593 et seq. supra.
167. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-1-30-31-1-32(1953) (summary administration
limited to personal property the cash value of which is not more than $1000).
168. In re Conley's Estate, 276 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1954).
169. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-1(1953).
170. See Dunham v. Stitzberg, 53 NM. 81, 201 P.2d 1000 (1949).
171. See note 168 supra.
172. N.M. CONST. Art. 6, § 23 (1949 amendment), granting probate courts
jurisdiction to determine heirship with respect to real property.
173. N.M. CONST. Art. 6, § 23; Dunham v. Stitzberg, 53 N.M. 81, 201 P.2d
1000 (1949).
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(2) The possible right to jury trial in disputes over the
nature or status of property as separate or community.
Taxes
Taxes are, of course, not merely a technical subject. They
epitomize the inseparable connection between the determination
of a purpose and the methods for attaining it. It is impossible
therefore to summarize the New Mexico and federal tax struc-
ture in the family law area, or make suggestions to clarify or
strengthen it. However, a few situations which exist by virtue
of statute or case law and which may create future problems
can be outlined. These and others are pointed out in the Re-
port.174
(1) The different tax consequences, state and federal, of
joint tenancy and community property ownership are signifi-
cant 175 but are not clearly understood.
(2) The New Mexico succession tax 7 6 is not chargeable
against the entire community estate when the husband dies first.
Only half of the estate is includible in the gross estate.1 7 How-
ever, if the husband is the surviving spouse, none of the com-
munity estate is subject to the succession tax.1 8
(3) Since 1948179 the above rule has been applicable with
respect to the federal estate tax when the wife survives. An
earlier federal case, Hernandez v. Becker, 80 following the New
Mexico succession tax rule decided that where the husband sur-
vives, none of the community estate is includible in the decedent
wife's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.
At the present time the above rules affect the valuation of
community property for purposes of computing capital gains
and losses. If the wife survives the husband a new basis for
valuation is acquired at the husband's death. But since the
entire community property "belongs to" the New Mexico hus-
174. REPORT, C. XI, p. 127.
175. See Marshall, Joint Tenancy, Taxwise and Otherwise, 40 CALIT. L.
REV. 501 (1952).
176. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-1 et seq. (1953).
177. REPORT, C. XI, pp. 132-133.
178. In re Chavez's Estate, 34 N.M. 258, 280 P.2d 241, 69 A.L.R. 769 (1929).
179. 26 FED. CODE ANN. §§ 800 et seq., 811(e) (2) was replaced in 1948. This
restored the community property law as it existed before 1942. See INT. REV.
CODE § 2040 (joint interests), § 2506(c)(2)(B)(C) (community property rules)
(1954).
180. 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931).
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band who survives his wife, he does not receive the benefit of
the federal law1 8' authorizing the new valuation.
(4) A New Mexico case'8 2 decided under the Federal Rev-
enue Act of 1942 raised the question of the ultimate liability for
payment of federal estate taxes. The case declared that this
was a local law matter. The Report183 to the Committee in the
analysis of the case, states: "No New Mexico decision was found
that determined the question of ultimate liability ... as be-
tween distributive interests of the state." However, in applying
apportionment in the Gallagher case, 8 4 the court commented:
"We have not tallied the jurisdictions on each side, but al-
though the earlier rule (ultimate liability borne by the resi-
due) may still represent the majority opinion of jurisdictions
passing on the question, we feel no compunction to adhere
inelastically to a rule which in view of this Court is not
productive of substantial justice. Certainly the vitality of
our legal system derives in large part from the function of
our courts in applying its root concepts, among them that
of equal treatment, to ever new and diversified problems.
(5) Transfers of property between spouses and transmuta-
tions of separate into community property, and vice versa, with
all their attendant complications, take place against the back-
ground of state and federal gift and estate taxes' 8, where further
technicalities are to be expected.
CONCLUSION
Society is confronted, more seriously than ever before, with
the disintegration of the family. The Married Women's Acts
and the "equal rights""'(' statutes for women do not seem to have
discouraged the trend and they may have heightened it. Much
of the difficulty in this area obviously lies outside the scope of a
marital property study. However, the family, like other social
institutions, has an economic as well as cultural framework. This
was true under all earlier systems and remains true today. But
the legal protections erected by the common law to sustain the
family unit, although many of them are still with us, became
181. See note 179 supra; REPORT, C. XI, p. 136.
182. In re Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112, 255 P.2d 317 (1953).
183. REPORT, C. XI, p. 1.32.
184. In re Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112, 130, 255 P.2d 317, 328 (1953).
185. REPORT, c. XI, p. 127.
186. See Wis. STAT. § 6.015 (1935); 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS
§ 150 (1935). 1 , , 1-
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outmoded during the Industrial Revolution and the rise of
political democracy. Beginning a century ago, the Married
Women's Acts obtained legal recognition for these historical
developments.
These acts were efforts to carry by law to middle class mar-
ried women the property rights already established in equity
for the wealthier classes. In large measure they accomplished
their purpose, yet at the same time the economic interests of
the spouses were in law pulled apart rather than together. This
did not in fact always happen largely because of the functional
and realistic attitudes of most married persons with respect to
the family resources. This general outlook is now a major part
of federal tax law.
An important problem for the law is to find ways to accom-
modate, with proper legal procedures and safeguards, the co-
ownership practices of married persons. The persons most con-
cerned are those who, either because of lack of funds, or the
mistaken belief that his services are superfluous, never consult
a lawyer, even about the matter of taking title to the family
home. Improvements in family law are not urgently needed for
those who can afford legal services. These persons may receive
some tax or other benefits as a consequence of improvement or
clarifications in the law, but in most cases they probably have
legal counsel to advise them.
The utility and convenience of a marital property system
should not be judged merely by the facility with which a divi-
sion of property can be had upon divorce, or tax matters han-
dled upon divorce or death, or even because there are certain tax
advantages to be had as a result of alimony, support or separa-
tion decrees or agreements."8 7 The system should be judged by
the manner in which it fulfills the needs of the individual and
the group, in this case the family and society.
88
Many husbands and wives are employed;8 9 the per capita
income and with it the average family income is rising steadily
in the United States. In the use and expenditure of this income
187. See Kragen, Stoke, Oliver, & Buckley, The Marriage Undone: Tax-
wise, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 408 (1954), for a California example of the type of
study needed in all states.
188. See Tenbroek, The Impact of Welfare Law upon Family Law, 42
CALIF. L. REV. 458 (1954). This article appears in an issue devoted entirely to
family law which contains several original and much-needed studies in the
field.
189. REPORT, C. II, p. 15.
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and property for the benefit of the family, concurrent ownership
ideas are advantageous and adaptable. It is believed that com-
munity of property principles, despite all the accumulated diffi-
culties delineated and alluded to here, furnish the "only signifi-
cant analogy"'19 in which a solution to problems of joint owner-
ship and control may be found.
The community states, therefore, as leaders in this field, must
take steps to clarify their own systems. The New Mexico ex-
perience and the Committee Report may provide some helpful
suggestions with which to begin.
190. See Townsend, Creation of Joint Rights Between Husband and Wife
in Personal Property, 52 MicH. L. REv. 779, 784 (1954); Daggett, Policy Ques-
tions in Marital Property Law in Louisiana, 14 LOUISANA LAW RViaW 528
(1954).
